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Abstract We present two empirical studies on exclusives, it-clefts, and pseudoclefts
(i.e., identity statements with a definite description) in which the at-issue and
not-at-issue content—a factor that has not been properly controlled for in prior
experimental work on cleft exhaustivity—were teased apart systematically. The
results show that violations of exhaustivity in it-clefts, a not-at-issue inference,
patterned differently from the necessary presupposition failures of the not-at-issue
semantic inferences. These findings pose a new experimental challenge to semantic
accounts of exhaustivity in it-clefts, while being in line with pragmatic accounts.
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1 Introduction
Focus-background it-clefts,1 as in (1a), along with exclusives and pseudoclefts (i.e.,
identity statements with a definite description), as in (1b) and (1c), respectively, are
all claimed to give rise to an EXHAUSTIVITY INFERENCE, illustrated in (2).
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stages in this research. All errors are our own.
1 Alternatively referred to as stressed-focus it-clefts (Prince 1978), topic-clause clefts (Hedberg 1990;
Delin & Oberlander 1995), or contrastive it-clefts (den Dikken 2013); compare to clefts in which the
cleft-pivot is the topic and the cleft-relative contains new information, referred to as topic-comment
clefts, informative-presupposition it-clefts (Prince 1978), comment-clause clefts (Hedberg 1990; Delin
& Oberlander 1995), or continuous-topic it-clefts (den Dikken 2013). See (1–2); new information is
underlined (examples from den Dikken 2013).
(1) Q: What got you interested in clefts?
A: It was Brian’s book that got me interested in clefts. (focus-background it-cleft)
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(1) a. It is Sabine who went to the zoo.
b. Only Sabine went to the zoo.
c. The person who went to the zoo is Sabine.
(2) → (EXH) Nobody other than Sabine went to the zoo.
While exhaustivity in exclusives (e.g., Atlas & Levinson 1981; Beaver & Clark
2008; Velleman, Beaver, Destruel, Bumford, Onea & Coppock 2012) and uniqueness
in definite descriptions (e.g., Frege 1892; Strawson 1950) are argued to be semantic in
nature, there is an ongoing debate about the SOURCE of exhaustivity in it-clefts.2 On
the one hand there are the semantic accounts, in which exhaustivity is argued to
be conventionally coded in the cleft structure (e.g., Atlas & Levinson 1981; Percus
1997; Velleman et al. 2012; Büring & Križ 2013); on the other hand there is the
pragmatic account, in which exhaustivity in clefts is claimed to be a conversational
implicature (Horn 1981, 2014).
Empirical research, often with exhaustivity in exclusives as a baseline, appears
to support a pragmatic approach, since cleft exhaustivity is comparatively weak
and more easily cancellable or violable (Destruel 2012; Destruel et al. 2015; Saur
2013; Byram-Washburn, Kaiser & Zubizarreta 2013). The STATUS of exhaustivity,
however—that is, whether exhaustivity is at-issue or not-at-issue—may pose a
potential confound to empirical research orthogonal to the semantic-pragmatic
debate. At issue content, that which directly addresses the Question under Discussion
(QUD) (Simons, Beaver, Tonhauser & Roberts 2010; Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts &
Simons 2013), is a critical factor that has not been properly controlled for in prior
experimental work (see Section 2.2). Crucially, exhaustivity in clefts is considered to
be not-at-issue; by contrast, exhaustivity in exclusives is claimed to be at-issue (see,
e.g., Horn 1981; Velleman et al. 2012; Büring & Križ 2013; Horn 2014; Destruel
et al. 2015). Perhaps the simplest contrast to illustrate this is found in the examples
in (3) (from Büring & Križ 2013: 2; modelled on Horn 1981).
(3) a. Not-At-Issue Exhaustivity in Clefts→ Uninformative
#She invited Fred, but it wasn’t Fred she invited.
b. At-Issue Exhaustivity in Exclusives→ Informative
3She invited Fred, but she didn’t invite only Fred.
It has been argued that an inference’s status as at-issue or not-at-issue is relevant
for many linguistic diagnostics, such as inter-speaker correction (Destruel et al.
(2) Q: Do you know Brian’s book?
A: It was Brian’s book that got me interested in clefts. (topic-comment it-cleft)
2 Following Destruel, Velleman, Onea, Bumford, Xue & Beaver (2015) we will use the following
terminology. SOURCE: semantic or pragmatic. STATUS: at-issue or not-at-issue.
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2015), intra-speaker cancellation (Mayol & Castroviejo 2013), NPI licensing, among
other things (Horn 2014). Yet Drenhaus, Zimmermann & Vasishth (2011), Destruel
(2012), and Destruel et al. (2015) have all modelled their claims about the not-at-
issue exhaustivity of clefts compared to the behavior of the at-issue exhaustivity of
exclusives. The goal of the present study is to test empirically how the not-at-issue
status of an inference influences acceptability judgments in a variation on more
standard cancellation tasks, referred to here as felicity under contradiction: in our
design, a conjunct explicitly negates the relevant at-issue and not-at-issue inferences
resulting in a contradiction for semantic inferences. We proceed as follows: In
Section 2 we briefly summarize several semantic and pragmatic accounts of cleft
exhaustivity, followed by an overview of the role at-issue and not-at-issue content is
argued to play in various linguistic diagnostics. We describe the methods and design
for our experiments in Section 3, which is further broken down into two subsections:
In Section 3.2 we present Experiment I (it-clefts vs. exclusives), and in Section 3.3
the follow-up Experiment II (pseudoclefts vs. exclusives). In Section 4 we discuss
the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Semantic vs. pragmatic accounts of cleft exhaustivity
Semantic accounts In Velleman et al. 2012, clefts and exclusives are argued to
belong to the family of inquiry terminating constructions that all serve the same
pragmatic function: to indicate that an answer to the current question is maximal.
However, they differ in what the at-issue content is: That is, they take exclusives
and clefts to encode the same semantics, but while clefts presuppose exhaustivity
(the MAX operator in their analysis) and assert the truth of the answer to the current
question (the MIN operator), for exclusives these operators are reversed, i.e., MAX is
asserted and MIN is presupposed.
Alternatively, there are several proposals in the literature in which clefts are
argued to be parallel to definite descriptions in their underlying syntax and seman-
tics (Percus 1997; Hedberg 2000; Büring & Križ 2013). Similar to Velleman et al.
2012, Büring & Križ (2013) argue that exhaustivity in clefts is presuppositional;
unlike Velleman et al. 2012, however, in this analysis cleft exhaustivity is captured
indirectly as a homogeneity—not a maximality—presupposition, which they propose
for definite descriptions as well. Given homogeneity, clefts and definite descriptions
presuppose that the elements in the identity statement are not a proper part of the sum
individual which satisfies the backgrounded predicate. For example, in a sentence
such as It was Fred she invited, it is presupposed that Fred is not one from a plurality
of individuals invited; i.e., either Fred is the only person she invited, or she did not
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invite Fred at all. The assertion of the cleft, e.g., She invited Fred, together with the
homogeneity presupposition, gives rise to the exhaustivity inference She invited Fred
and no one else.
In an earlier proposal, Percus (1997) claims that clefts and pseudoclefts with
a definite description are derived from the same underlying syntactic structure.
Specifically, the cleft relative is the result of extraposition of the relative clause from
an identity statement with a definite description (e.g., The one(s) [that Mary saw] is
John→ The one(s) ti is John [that Mary saw]i), while the pronoun it is the spell out of
the definite, resulting in the it-cleft structure (i.e., It ti is John [that Mary saw]i).3 As
Percus (1997: 339) argues, this analysis can account for the characteristics that clefts
and definite descriptions share (e.g., semantic interpretation, binding, NPI licensing,
etc.), since they “are identical in their properties, and any account that applies to one
should apply to the other.” Importantly, exhaustivity in clefts is nothing more than
uniqueness in definite descriptions (Percus 1997: 342).
Despite differing in the details, what the above semantic approaches all share is
that exhaustivity is coded in the cleft structure itself.
Pragmatic account On the other side of the theoretical debate, Horn (1981, 2014)
proposes that exhaustivity in clefts is an example of Gricean pragmatic enrich-
ment. This view is supported by various observations, such as, for instance, that
cleft exhaustivity neither behaves as other entailments nor projects, as with typical
presuppositions, and, moreover, that in some contexts exhaustivity appears to be
defeasible, illustrated by the corpus data in (4).
(4) a. “. . . it was the gift that killed him, as much as anything.”
(Stochastic Man by Robert Silverberg, cited by Horn 1981 via Ellen Prince)
b. “Yes, it is bread we fight for—but we fight for roses too!”
(in a poem by James Oppenheim in 1911, cited by Horn 2014)
In Horn 1981, the exhaustivity effect for clefts is captured as a generalized
conversational implicature, in which the existence presupposition triggered by the
cleft relative is essential for deriving the exhaustivity implicature. Later, Horn (2014)
revises this claim and suggests that the exhaustivity effect is due to general pragmatic
principles operating on the focal alternatives.
Orthogonal to the semantic-pragmatic debate, however, but relevant for empirical
work on cleft exhaustivity, is the role at-issueness is argued to play in various
linguistic diagnostics.
3 However, clefts are underspecified for number—indicated by one(s) above—which in Percus’s (1997)
analysis is represented with a null head in the underlying DP; cf. definite descriptions, which encode
singular and plural features (Percus 1997; Büring & Križ 2013).
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2.2 (Not-)at-issue content in various linguistic diagnostics
Destruel et al. (2015) argue that the Yes, but. . . test used by Onea & Beaver (2009) for
Hungarian pre-verbal focus is only sensitive to an inference’s status as at-issue or not-
at-issue, and not its source as semantic or pragmatic, contra the conclusions drawn
in Onea & Beaver 2009. They conducted a series of experiments comparing various
inferences differing in both their source and status (namely, relevance implicatures,
scalar implicatures, appositives, and non-restrictive relative clauses), and found that
it was the not-at-issue content that elicited a majority of inter-speaker corrections
with Yes, but, regardless of the inference being semantic or pragmatic.
In two empirical studies, Mayol & Castroviejo (2013) test whether or not at-
issueness influences the felicity judgments of cancellation for scalar implicatures.
What they find is that cancellation was rated significantly better when the at-issue
content in the cancellation differed from the original at-issue inference (Kuppevelt
1996), which is illustrated in the contrast in (5).4 In other words, the felicity of the
cancellation depended on the QUD answered by the cancellation being different
from the original QUD, shown by the change in focus-marking in (5b). (Examples
cited from Mayol & Castroviejo 2013: 88.)
(5) a. (QUD) How many cars do you have?
I have [two]F cars. #In fact, I have [three]F .
b. (QUD) Who has two cars?
[I]F have two cars. 3In fact, I have [three]F .
Moreover, Horn (2014) argues that, among other things, differences in at-issue
status account for differences in NPI licensing. As an example, barely can license an
NPI such as lift a finger (meaning ‘help’), as in (6a) (despite exhibiting veridicality
and not being downward entailing), while the semantically similar almost cannot, as
in (6b) (examples from Horn 2014).
(6) a. 3Dana barely lifted a finger to help.
b. *Dana almost lifted a finger to help.
Consider the differences in the (not-)at-issue status of the inferences in (7–8),
illustrating that NPIs can only be licensed by at-issue negation.
(7) Dana barely lifted a finger to help.
a. (At-Issue) Dana came close to not lifting a finger to help.
4 Example (5a) may be possible with the interpretation that the speaker is correcting herself, referred to
as SELF-REPAIR. In their experiments, Mayol & Castroviejo (2013) find that conditions with explicit
triggers for self-repair (e.g., “I mean, . . . ” instead of “In fact, . . . ”) were generally judged worse than
cancellations with QUD change.
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b. (Not-At-Issue) Dana helped.
(8) *Dana almost lifted a finger to help.
a. (At-Issue) Dana came close to helping.
b. (Not-At-Issue) Dana did not lift a finger to help.
In sum, the status of an inference as at-issue or not-at-issue has been shown to
play a critical role in various linguistic diagnostics. Thus, although the not-at-issue
exhaustivity of clefts has been found to be weaker than the at-issue exhaustivity in
exclusives, conclusive results when testing exhaustivity effects will require careful
controls for at-issue content.
3 Experiments I & II
3.1 Methods
In order to examine the role (not-)at-issueness plays in diagnostics of exhaustivity,
we explore two (non-mutually exclusive) hypotheses here, namely, that exhaustivity
in clefts is weaker than exhaustivity in exclusives because:
• Hypothesis 1: the STATUS of exhaustivity in clefts is different than in exclu-
sives (i.e., cleft exhaustivity is not-at-issue).
• Hypothesis 2: the SOURCE of exhaustivity in clefts is different than in
exclusives (i.e., cleft exhaustivity is pragmatic).
We conducted two experiments in German for three sentence types: exclusives, as
in (9), it-clefts, as in (10), and definite descriptions—i.e., pseudoclefts containing
an identity statement with a definite description—as in (11), disentangled below in
terms of their (a) at-issue and (b) not-at-issue content.
(9) Nur
only
Sabine
Sabine
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht.
visited
‘Only Sabine visited the zoo.’ (exclusive)
a. At-Issue, Semantic→ Nobody other than Sabine visited the zoo.
b. Not-At-Issue, Semantic→ Sabine visited the zoo.
(10) Es
it
ist
is
Sabine,
Sabine
die
who
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
hat.
has
‘It is Sabine who visited the zoo.’ (it-cleft)
a. At-Issue, Semantic→ Sabine visited the zoo.
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b. Not-At-Issue, Sem./Prag.? → Nobody other than Sabine visited the zoo.
(11) Diejenige,
the.one
die
who
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
hat,
has
ist
is
Sabine.
Sabine
‘The one who visited the zoo is Sabine.’ (definite description)
a. At-Issue, Semantic→ Person who visited the zoo = Sabine.
b. Not-At-Issue, Semantic→ Unique person who visited the zoo is Sabine.
(i.e., Nobody other than Sabine visited the zoo.)
The experiments were designed such that the intra-speaker violations of the above
at-issue (AI) and not-at-issue (NAI) inferences were manipulated systematically.
Target items were constructed by conjoining one of the three sentence types in (9–11)
with the negation of the (a) AI and (b) NAI content using the following schemas:
(12) a. S and ¬(at-issue inference) b. S and ¬(not-at-issue inference)
With schema (a), we set a baseline for semantic contradiction: An assertion con-
joined with the negation of that assertion should invariably be unacceptable. By
contrast, schema (b) triggers a NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE for semantic
inferences (Heim & Kratzer 1998: §4.4.4): If a proposition p triggers the presuppo-
sition q and then is conjoined with not(q), it will give rise to a presupposition failure
given the semantics alone, illustrated by the infelicity of a sentence such as #My cat
is sick and I don’t have a cat. Note that although we refer to schemas (a) and (b) in
(12) as at-issue and not-at-issue CONTRADICTIONS, with this terminology we wish
to remain neutral as to the source of the not-at-issue inference in the case of clefts.
We predict the following:
• Assuming cleft exhaustivity is semantic (e.g., presuppositional following
Velleman et al. 2012; Percus 1997; Büring & Križ 2013), if its status as
not-at-issue is responsible for the higher acceptability rates when violated,
then schema (b) across sentence types will show similar patterns.
• Alternatively, assuming cleft exhaustivity is pragmatic (following Horn 1981,
2014), if its source as pragmatic is responsible for the higher acceptability
rates when violated, then schema (b) for clefts will show a different pattern
from schema (b) for exclusives and pseudoclefts with definite descriptions,
and the latter two will pattern alike.
Example target items in German and their glosses are presented for Experiment I in
Section 3.2 and for Experiment II in Section 3.3; furthermore, see Appendix A for
the complete list of lexicalizations in the exclusive condition for both at-issue and
not-at-issue contradictions.
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3.2 Experiment I: it-clefts & exclusives
Design Experiment I employed a 2x2 factorial design, SENTENCE TYPE (two
levels: Exclusive, Cleft) and CONTRADICTION TYPE (two levels: At-Issue (AI),
Not-At-Issue (NAI)), fully crossed, in a pen-and-paper questionnaire. Thus, there
were a total of four conditions, and for each condition (Exclusive AI, Cleft AI,
Exclusive NAI, Cleft NAI) there were 12 lexicalizations, with a sum of 48 target
items per questionnaire. There was a 1:1 filler ratio, for 96 sentences total. Filler
items were expected to be relatively more acceptable (i.e., SVO and OVS word
orders, with non-contradictory subject and object contrasts in the conjunction). The
target and filler items were randomized and a Latin square distribution of the targets
was done over four questionnaires. No two targets or fillers appeared next to each
other, and the order of items was presented both forward and backward for a total
of eight questionnaires. Target items (13) and (14) provide a baseline for semantic
contradiction, whereas (15) and (16) are the main points of comparison for the NAI
inferences.
(13) Exclusive, AI Contradiction [ exh(p) ∧ ¬(exh) ]
Nur
only
Sabine
Sabine
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
und
and
Anna
Anna
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht.
visited
TARGET: ‘Only Sabine visited the zoo and Anna visited the zoo.’
(14) it-Cleft, AI Contradiction [ p ∧ ¬(p) ]
Es
it
ist
is
Sabine,
Sabine
die
who
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
hat,
has
und
and
sie
she
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
nicht
not
besucht.
visited
TARGET: ‘It is Sabine who visited the zoo and she did not visit the zoo.’
(15) Exclusive, NAI Contradiction [ p ∧ ¬(p) ]
Nur
only
Sabine
Sabine
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
und
and
sie
she
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
nicht
not
besucht.
visited
TARGET: ‘Only Sabine visited the zoo and she did not visit the zoo.’
(16) it-Cleft, NAI Contradiction [ exh(p) ∧ ¬(exh) ]
Es
it
ist
is
Sabine,
Sabine
die
who
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
hat,
has
und
and
Anna
Anna
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht.
visited
TARGET: ‘It is Sabine who visited the zoo and Anna visited the zoo.’
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Participants Thirty-two German native-speakers from Universität Potsdam (twenty-
three female, eight male, and one withheld) participated in Experiment I. Compen-
sation was either thirty minutes participation credit as part of the requirements for
a Bachelor’s degree or 5 Euro. The mean participant age was 22, ranging from
20 to 36. Thirty-one of the participants had completed a high school degree, and
one participant had a Master’s degree or higher. All grew up in Germany. Seven
participants had at least one parent who grew up outside of Germany, and five con-
sidered themselves bilingual (from childhood) in German and one other language.
All reported speaking at least one foreign language, and most two or more.
Results A linear mixed effects analysis was conducted using R (R Core Team
2015) and lme4 (R package version 1.1-8, Bates, Mächler, Bolker & Walker 2015),
with pairwise comparisons of the full models with the effects in question against the
models without the effects in question. The exclusive and at-issue conditions served
as baselines. There was a highly significant interaction of sentence and contradiction
type (β = 1.76563, SE = 0.11608, t = 15.211): That is, the effect of contradiction
type differed between clefts and exclusives, as seen in the left graph in Figure 1 on
page 383, and this effect was highly significant (with a t-value above 2 indicating
significance). For the simple effects, judgments for clefts and exclusives did not
significantly differ in the at-issue condition (β = -0.09375, SE = 0.10931, t = -0.858),
visible by the overlapping means in the at-issue condition in the left graph in Figure
1. Contradiction type did significantly affect participants’ judgments for clefts—with
an increase in the means for clefts from the AI condition to the NAI condition by ca.
1.72 points, seen in the steep slope upwards—but the effect of contradiction type
was not significant for exclusives (β = -0.04427, SE = 0.08208, t = -0.539), visible
in the almost flat line between the AI and NAI conditions in the left graph in Figure
1. See Table 1 on page 385 for a table of means and standard deviations.
Discussion: Experiment I Hypothesis 1, i.e., that cleft exhaustivity is weaker
because it is not-at-issue, is not supported. Whereas there was no improvement in
acceptability for exclusives between the AI and NAI conditions, there was a highly
significant improvement for clefts in the NAI condition. Hypothesis 2, i.e., that cleft
exhaustivity is weaker because it is pragmatic, is compatible with the results here.
In a couple of recent studies, however, there is compelling data suggesting that
not-at-issue content constitutes a non-homogeneous class (Cummins, Amaral &
Katsos 2013; Tonhauser, Beaver, Degen, de Marneffe, Roberts & Simons 2015)
and, crucially, that the prejacent of exclusives behaves differently from other not-
at-issue inferences. For instance, Cummins et al. (2013) conducted an experiment
testing various presupposition triggers in question-answer pairs. Their experimental
381
DeVeaugh-Geiss, Zimmermann, Onea, and Boell
manipulations included inter-speaker acceptance/rejection of at-issue and not-at-
issue content. Cummins et al. (2013) are cautious about making too strong a claim
regarding the variation found in their results; however, one notices that the Yes,
although responses for exclusives—i.e., affirming the assertion with Yes while
denying the prejacent in the although-clause5—had the lowest mean rating on a
5-point Likert scale and the lowest standard deviation of all of the presupposition
triggers tested.6
Furthermore, in a series of recent experiments testing degrees of projectivity
and not-at-issueness, Tonhauser et al. (2015) find significant variation for numerous
triggers of projective content. Important here, the results for the prejacent of only
differed significantly in being overall less projective and less not-at-issue not only
in comparison to projective content from triggers in a different category (Class
B in Tonhauser et al.’s (2013) four-way taxonomy) but also from triggers within
its own category (namely, Class C; see Tonhauser et al. 2013). Thus, in order to
check whether the results in Experiment I were due to the prejacent of exclusives
behaving unusually with respect to other not-at-issue inferences, we ran a follow-
up experiment in order to compare the presupposition failure of exclusives to its
counterpart in definite descriptions.
3.3 Experiment II: Pseudoclefts & exclusives
Design Experiment II compared exclusives to pseudoclefts with definite descrip-
tions in the same experimental design. If the results from Experiment I are due to
the prejacent of exclusives being different from other not-at-issue inferences, then
the presupposition failure for exclusives is predicted to behave differently from the
presupposition failure for definite descriptions in this follow-up experiment.
Target and filler items and their distribution were identical to Experiment I,
except it-clefts were replaced with their corresponding pseudoclefts containing an
identity statement with a definite description, illustrated below.
(17) (exclusives were identical to Experiment I in both the AI and NAI conditions)
(18) Definite Description, AI Contradiction [ p ∧ ¬(p) ]
Diejenige,
the.one
die
who
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
hat,
has
ist
is
Sabine
Sabine
und
and
sie
she
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
5 This is the inter-speaker version of the intra-speaker contradiction illustrated in (15).
6 Specifically, in their experiment the mean naturalness rating for exclusives in the yes, although
condition was 1.30 (SD = 0.92) on a five-point scale, 1 being “completely unnatural” and 5 being
“completely natural.” 2.06 was the overall mean naturalness rating for the triggers tested in this
condition, with 2.95 being the highest mean rating (too); see Table 2 in Cummins et al. 2013: 210
for an overview. Other triggers tested include comparatives as well as the lexical triggers too, again,
continue, still, stop, and regret, roughly in order here for mean judgments of more to less natural.
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Figure 1 Experiment I is shown on the left; Experiment II is shown on the right.
The interaction of sentence and contradiction type was highly significant
in Experiment I, but did not reach significance in Experiment II.
nicht
not
besucht.
visited
TARGET: ‘The one who visited the zoo is Sabine and she didn’t visit the zoo.’
(19) Definite Description, NAI Contradiction [ p ∧ ¬(exh) ]
Diejenige,
the.one
die
who
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht
visited
hat,
has
ist
is
Sabine
Sabine
und
and
Anna
Anna
hat
has
den
the
Tierpark
zoo
besucht.
visited
TARGET: ‘The one who visited the zoo is Sabine and Anna visited the zoo.’
Note that the definite description target items were constructed using the compounds
derjenige / diejenige / dasjenige, which are composed of the definite articles der
/ die / das ‘the.MASC / the.FEM / the.NEUT’ plus -jenige. Etymologically, -jenige
developed from jene / jener, which means “that one (over there)”; note that jene
may appear on its own, but -jenige cannot. Additionally, the compounds derjenige /
diejenige / dasjenige take the appropriate case endings (for instance, demjenigen /
derjenigen / demjenigen for the dative case, and so on for the accusative and genitive
cases). Since they are always functioning as the grammatical subjects here, the
compound definites display the nominative case.
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Participants Thirty-two German native-speakers from both Universität Potsdam
and Humboldt Universität (twenty-one female and eleven male) participated in
Experiment II. Compensation was 3 Euro. The mean participant age was 26, ranging
from 18 to 40. Twelve of the participants had completed a high school degree, twelve
participants had completed a Bachelor’s degree, one a vocational degree, and seven
had a Master’s degree or higher. All grew up in Germany. Three participants had
at least one parent who grew up outside of Germany. Two participants considered
themselves bilingual (from childhood) in German and one other language, and one
was trilingual in German and two other languages. All reported speaking at least
one foreign language, and most two or more.
Results A linear mixed effects analysis was conducted using R and lme4, with
pairwise comparisons of the full models with the effects in question against the
models without the effects in question. Just as in Experiment I, the exclusive and at-
issue conditions served as baselines. Unlike in Experiment I, there was no significant
interaction of sentence and contradiction type (β = -0.04025, SE = 0.09978, t =
-0.403), indicating there was no statistical difference of the effect of contradiction
type between the two sentence types, visible in the parallel slopes in the right graph
in Figure 1 on page 383. For the simple effects, judgments for exclusives and definite
descriptions did not significantly differ in the at-issue condition (β = 0.08683, SE =
0.08408, t = 1.033), visible by the overlapping means in the right graph in Figure 1.
However, the effect of contradiction type did reach significance for exclusives (β
= 0.32688, SE = 0.07050, t = 4.637), and this effect was not significantly different
between the exclusive and definite description conditions. A summary of means and
standard deviations for both experiments is found in Table 1.7
Discussion: Experiment II The results in Experiment II did not fully replicate
the results for exclusives from Experiment I: in Experiment I exclusives were judged
equally unacceptable across the AI and NAI conditions (visible in the flat line),
while in Experiment II there was a very slight but statistically significant increase in
acceptability in the NAI condition (visible in the gradual upward slant)—notably,
the same effect was found for definite descriptions. In other words, the contradiction
of at-issue content was judged as slightly worse than the presupposition failure
for exclusives and definite descriptions; crucially, however, exclusives and definite
descriptions patterned similarly in this regard.8
7 Note that two participants overlooked one entire page (with 8 sentences per page) when completing
the questionnaires for Experiment II, resulting in some missing data points for the targets and filler.
8 It may be that acceptability judgments for exclusives were not replicated given differences in the
proportions of acceptable to unacceptable sentences having a local effect within the experiment. That
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Experiment I Experiment II
sent. contr. n mean (sd) sent. contr. n mean(sd)
Excl. AI 384 1.703 (1.103) Excl. AI 382 1.780 (1.172)
Excl. NAI 384 1.659 (1.181) Excl. NAI 383 2.112 (1.559)
Cleft AI 384 1.609 (1.036) DefDes AI 383 1.872 (1.289)
Cleft NAI 384 3.331 (1.711) DefDes NAI 380 2.145 (1.346)
Table 1 A summary of means and standard deviations for both experiments.
4 General discussion
In light of the results reported here, the hypothesis that cleft exhaustivity is weaker
than in exclusives because it is not-at-issue is not supported. In Experiment I the
not-at-issue exhaustivity inference of clefts patterned differently from the not-at-
issue prejacent in exclusives—with the cleft exhaustivity violation being judged
more acceptable than the presupposition failure of the exclusive—and this differ-
ence was highly significant. Moreover, in Experiment II we found that the results
in the first experiment cannot simply be attributed to the prejacent of exclusives
behaving unusually compared to other not-at-issue semantic inferences: Judgments
of the presupposition failure for exclusives patterned on a par with the uniqueness
presupposition failure for definite descriptions.
Hypothesis 2, namely, that cleft exhaustivity is weaker than in exclusives because
it is pragmatic, is compatible with the results here (following Horn 1981, 2014). We
will flesh out a pragmatic proposal shortly, but first we would like to discuss what
the above results mean for the semantic theories of cleft exhaustivity discussed in
Section 2.1.
A challenge for semantic theories The results here pose a challenge for semantic
theories of cleft exhaustivity. Velleman et al.’s (2012) proposal—in which clefts and
exclusives have the same underlying semantics but vary only in what is at-issue and
what is not-at-issue—is not compatible with these results, at least not without some
modification to account for the seemingly aberrant behavior of clefts. If their theory
is correct, the exhaustivity inference which arises from a sentence with the form
It is x that P and y P should be judged as unacceptable as other contradictions of
semantic content.
is, Experiment I had more intermediately acceptable sentences in the Cleft NAI condition, whereas
Experiment II had more unacceptable sentences in the Definite Description NAI condition. These
differences may influence the relative judgments of sentences when compared to the other sentences
presented in the questionnaires.
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One might claim that exhaustivity in clefts fundamentally differs from the preja-
cent of exclusives, in that cleft exhaustivity involves quantification (i.e., over some
contextually-provided domain) whereas the prejacent does not, and this may account
for the difference in judgments found in Experiment I. For Velleman et al. 2012 this
argument is a non-starter, however: in their analysis, both the MIN and the MAX
operators involve quantification (an existential quantifier and a universal quantifier
quantifying over true answers, respectively). Additionaly, an explanation based on
quantification in order to account for the deviant results for clefts in Experiment I
would have trouble accounting for the parallel results for definite descriptions in Ex-
periment II, since in most standard accounts of definite descriptions the uniqueness
presupposition also involves existential quantification.
The proposals of Percus 1997 and Büring & Križ 2013 similarly run into trou-
ble in light of these results. With Percus’s (1997: 339) analysis, it is difficult to
account for why clefts in Experiment I and definite descriptions in Experiment II
would behave so differently when compared to exclusives, since clefts and definite
descriptions are “structurally indistinguishable.”9 Whereas Büring & Križ’s (2013)
analysis does not rely on clefts having the same semantics as definite descriptions,
their account of cleft exhaustivity as a homogeneity presupposition would have
similar problems as Velleman et al.’s (2012) presuppositional analysis. In the di-
agnostic used here, when cleft exhaustivity is violated one would predict that the
resulting presupposition failure should render the sentence just as unacceptable as
other necessary presupposition failures, again contrary to fact.
Toward a solution The proposal in Horn 1981, in which cleft exhaustivity is a
generalized conversational implicature, provides one potential pragmatic analysis.
Moreover, the discussion in Horn 2014, in which the exhaustivity effect is suggested
to be due to general pragmatic principles operating on the focal alternatives, may
also offer a way to account for cleft exhaustivity, but the details remain unclear. Here
we wish to spell out an analysis in which exhaustivity in clefts is a focus-triggered
scalar implicature.
Focus-background it-clefts—with the bipartite structure consisting of a focused
cleft pivot and a backgrounded existential presupposition cleft relative—have been
claimed to be licensed by discourse-semantic factors, for instance, by discourse-
structural (Delin 1992; Delin & Oberlander 1995) or metalinguistic discourse factors
(Destruel & Velleman 2014); cf. common-ground management in Krifka 2008. By
backgrounding the relative clause, focus-background it-clefts are a structural device
which mark a focus unambiguously, assuming that focus projection out of the cleft
9 Again, modulo number specification for definite descriptions; see footnote 3 on page 376.
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pivot is not possible.10 The alternatives and the QUD are thus clearly designated,
which provides optimal conditions for information-enriching implicatures: The focal
alternatives build scales, and the quantity maxim conversationally implicates the
exclusion of alternatives higher on the scale. Such a proposal could account for
the data here. In this approach, exhaustivity is not coded in the cleft structure but
is derived from standard pragmatic principles; and thus, as with other examples of
Gricean pragmatic enrichment, the exhaustivity inference is defeasible, as has been
observed in the literature (again, see the sentences in (4) for corpus examples from
Horn 1981, 2014).
Nevertheless, one still has to account for the difficulty in cancelling the exhaus-
tivity implicature in clefts, as suggested in the results here (given the mid-to-low
acceptability ratings) and also observed in both the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture, in particular in comparisons of cleft exhaustivity and exhaustivity effects for
canonical focus. There are two ways to address this: First, we would like to propose
that it is not necessarily clefts that have strong exhaustivity effects, but canonical
focus that has weak exhaustivity effects. Clefts provide an ideal environment for
information-enrichment. For canonical focus, however, this is not the case: The
possibility of focus projection structurally allows for an ambiguous domain of alter-
natives (not only for objects; see Büring 2006, who claims that focus projection is
possible from canonical subjects as well), resulting in a suboptimal environment for
pragmatic enrichment. Second, in these experiments clefts appeared out of the blue
and thus the discourse factors which license clefts were absent, which could account
for the low acceptability judgments unrelated to exhaustivity per se.
If this approach is going down the right path, there are several predictions
we would like to test in future research. First, we expect a strong difference in
exhaustivity between object it-clefts, which do not allow for focus projection, and
canonical object foci, which do. Similarly, since focus accent on subjects may
not mark focus unambiguously in canonical sentences either, we expect canonical
sentences with focused subjects to be not as exhaustive as subject it-clefts. Finally,
in contexts in which other pragmatic reasons for focus are available, we predict that
10 There are examples of subconstituent focus-marking in the cleft pivot, in which the pivot contains a
complex noun phrase and only a subconstituent is the focus, as discussed by Velleman et al. 2012.
(1) a. It was John’s [eldest]F daughter who liked the movie.
→ None of John’s other daughters liked the movie.
b. It was [John’s]F eldest daughter who liked the movie.
→ Nobody else’s eldest daughter liked the movie.
In these examples, pitch accent would disambiguate the focus in spoken speech, whereas without any
additional linguistic markers the sentences remain ambiguous. Nevertheless, projection out of the
cleft pivot appears not to be possible.
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exhaustivity implicatures can be replaced by other implicatures, such as mirativity
or unexpectedness (see Skopeteas & Fanselow 2011; Destruel & Velleman 2014).
5 Conclusion
We presented two experiments employing a felicity judgment task in which we
compared (not-)at-issue inferences with other (not-)at-issue inferences. In particular,
we compared the necessary presupposition failures of exclusives to violations of
exhaustivity in it-clefts in Experiment I; and in Experiment II—as a follow-up to
check that the prejacent of exclusives is not unusual compared to other not-at-issue
semantic inferences in our diagnostic—we compared the necessary presupposition
failures of exclusives to its counterpart in pseudoclefts with a definite description.
What we found is that violations of cleft exhaustivity patterned differently from
contradictions of semantic content, which poses a new experimental challenge
to semantic accounts of exhaustivity in clefts, while being in line with pragmatic
accounts. We propose a pragmatic analysis of cleft exhaustivity in which exhaustivity
is a focus-triggered scalar implicature.
A German stimuli
Items adapted from Saur’s (2013) Master’s thesis. The corresponding items for
it-clefts and definite descriptions will not be presented here, although reconstructing
them should be unproblematic; see Sections 3.2–3.3 for examples.
01A: Nur Bruno hat den Zoobesucher bespuckt und der Jugendliche hat den Zoobesucher bespuckt.
01B: Nur Bruno hat den Zoobesucher bespuckt und er hat den Zoobesucher nicht bespuckt.
02A: Nur Norbert hat den Vater gerufen und Peter hat den Vater gerufen.
02B: Nur Norbert hat den Vater gerufen und er hat den Vater nicht gerufen.
03A: Nur Phillip hat die Katze gefüttert und Lars hat die Katze gefüttert.
03B: Nur Phillip hat die Katze gefüttert und er hat die Katze nicht gefüttert.
04A: Nur Hoppel hat das Kabel angeknabbert und Moppel hat das Kabel angeknabbert.
04B: Nur Hoppel hat das Kabel angeknabbert und er hat das Kabel nicht angeknabbert.
05A: Nur Klaus hat zu dem Überfall recherchiert und Hendrik hat zu dem Überfall recherchiert.
05B: Nur Klaus hat zu dem Überfall recherchiert und er hat nicht zu dem Überfall recherchiert.
06A: Nur Fred hat den Hund geneckt und John hat den Hund geneckt.
06B: Nur Fred hat den Hund geneckt und er hat den Hund nicht geneckt.
07A: Nur Lukas hat den Onkel gebissen und Peter hat den Onkel gebissen.
07B: Nur Lukas hat den Onkel gebissen und er hat den Onkel nicht gebissen.
08A: Nur Oliver hat die Königin begleitet und der König hat die Königin begleitet.
08B: Nur Oliver hat die Königin begleitet und er hat die Königin nicht begleitet.
09A: Nur Andreas hat das Bier getrunken und Markus hat das Bier getrunken.
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09B: Nur Andreas hat das Bier getrunken und er hat das Bier nicht getrunken.
10A: Nur das Wildschwein, das den Zaun zertrampelt und der Förster hat den Zaun zertrampelt.
10B: Nur das Wildschwein, das den Zaun zertrampelt und es hat den Zaun nicht zertrampelt.
11A: Nur Simon hat den Knaben beobachtet und der Butler hat den Knaben beobachtet.
11B: Nur Simon hat den Knaben beobachtet und er hat den Knaben nicht beobachtet.
12A: Nur Ludwig hat die Steine geworfen und Joschka hat die Steine geworfen.
12B: Nur Ludwig hat die Steine geworfen und er hat die Steine nicht geworfen.
13A: Nur Louis hat den Libero kritisiert und Leander hat den Libero kritisiert.
13B: Nur Louis hat den Libero kritisiert und er hat den Libero nicht kritisiert.
14A: Nur Kasper hat die Kinder erfreut und der Räuber hat die Kinder erfreut.
14B: Nur Kasper hat die Kinder erfreut und er hat die Kinder nicht erfreut.
15A: Nur Timo hat die Kühe gemolken und Oskar hat die Kühe gemolken.
15B: Nur Timo hat die Kühe gemolken und er hat die Kühe nicht gemolken.
16A: Nur Günther hat den Kandidaten verwirrt und der Telefonjoker hat den Kandidaten verwirrt.
16B: Nur Günther hat den Kandidaten verwirrt und er hat den Kandidaten nicht verwirrt.
17A: Nur Laura hat das Fenster zerbrochen und Angela hat das Fenster zerbrochen.
17B: Nur Laura hat das Fenster zerbrochen und sie hat das Fenster nicht zerbrochen.
18A: Nur Lothar hat das Tor getroffen und Stefan hat das Tor getroffen.
18B: Nur Lothar hat das Tor getroffen und er hat das Tor nicht getroffen.
19A: Nur Franziska hat das Publikum begrüßt und Stefanie hat das Publikum begrüßt.
19B: Nur Franziska hat das Publikum begrüßt und sie hat das Publikum nicht begrüßt.
20A: Nur Melissa hat den Hustensaft empfohlen und Kerstin hat den Hustensaft empfohlen.
20B: Nur Melissa hat den Hustensaft empfohlen und sie hat den Hustensaft nicht empfohlen.
21A: Nur Michaela hat den Specht gesehen und Pia hat den Specht gesehen.
21B: Nur Michaela hat den Specht gesehen und sie hat den Specht nicht gesehen.
22A: Nur Gustav hat die Gurken gekauft und Ede hat die Gurken gekauft.
22B: Nur Gustav hat die Gurken gekauft und er hat die Gurken nicht gekauft.
23A: Nur Sabrina hat das Baumhaus gebaut und Nadia hat das Baumhaus gebaut.
23B: Nur Sabrina hat das Baumhaus gebaut und sie hat das Baumhaus nicht gebaut.
24A: Nur Barbara hat den Mathetest verpasst und Hanna hat den Mathetest verpasst.
24B: Nur Barbara hat den Mathetest verpasst und sie hat den Mathetest nicht verpasst.
25A: Nur Linda hat die Gäste empfangen und Lucy hat die Gäste empfangen.
25B: Nur Linda hat die Gäste empfangen und sie hat die Gäste nicht empfangen.
26A: Nur Theresia hat die Kursteilnehmer gestört und Susanne hat die Kursteilnehmer gestört.
26B: Nur Theresia hat die Kursteilnehmer gestört und sie hat die Kursteilnehmer nicht gestört.
27A: Nur Melanie hat die Sängerin überzeugt und Tatjana hat die Sängerin überzeugt.
27B: Nur Melanie hat die Sängerin überzeugt und sie hat die Sängerin nicht überzeugt.
28A: Nur Polina hat das Publikum begeistert und Emma hat das Publikum begeistert.
28B: Nur Polina hat das Publikum begeistert und sie hat das Publikum nicht begeistert.
29A: Nur Mandy hat den Kuchen gebacken und Agnes hat den Kuchen gebacken.
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29B: Nur Mandy hat den Kuchen gebacken und sie hat den Kuchen nicht gebacken.
30A: Nur Isabella hat sich um die Stute gekümmert und Sarah hat sich um die Stute gekümmert.
30B: Nur Isabella hat sich um die Stute gekümmert und sie hat sich nicht um die Stute gekümmert.
31A: Nur Katja hat den Lippenstift benutzt und Ulla hat den Lippenstift benutzt.
31B: Nur Katja hat den Lippenstift benutzt und sie hat den Lippenstift nicht benutzt.
32A: Nur Petra hat die Mitbewohnerin aufgeweckt und Imke hat die Mitbewohnerin aufgeweckt.
32B: Nur Petra hat die Mitbewohnerin aufgeweckt und sie hat die Mitbewohnerin nicht aufgeweckt.
33A: Nur Steffen hat den Verkäufer beleidigt und Jochen hat den Verkäufer beleidigt.
33B: Nur Steffen hat den Verkäufer beleidigt und er hat den Verkäufer nicht beleidigt.
34A: Nur Gustav hat den Marathon bewältigt und Edwin hat den Marathon bewältigt.
34B: Nur Gustav hat den Marathon bewältigt und er hat den Marathon nicht bewältigt.
35A: Nur Robert hat den Schüler getadelt und Thomas hat den Schüler getadelt.
35B: Nur Robert hat den Schüler getadelt und er hat den Schüler nicht getadelt.
36A: Nur Aaron hat den Halbstarken aufgehalten und Daniel hat den Halbstarken aufgehalten.
36B: Nur Aaron hat den Halbstarken aufgehalten und er hat den Halbstarken nicht aufgehalten.
37A: Nur Holger hat die Menschen verzaubert und Bertram hat die Menschen verzaubert.
37B: Nur Holger hat die Menschen verzaubert und er hat die Menschen nicht verzaubert.
38A: Nur Björn hat das Auto gerammt und Steve hat das Auto gerammt.
38B: Nur Björn hat das Auto gerammt und er hat das Auto nicht gerammt.
39A: Nur Sören hat den Abgeordneten gewählt und Paul hat den Abgeordneten gewählt.
39B: Nur Sören hat den Abgeordneten gewählt und er hat den Abgeordneten nicht gewählt.
40A: Nur Moritz hat den Teddybären gewonnen und Malte hat den Teddybären gewonnen.
40B: Nur Moritz hat den Teddybären gewonnen und er hat den Teddybären nicht gewonnen.
41A: Nur Judith hat den Enkel angemeckert und Lisa hat den Enkel angemeckert.
41B: Nur Judith hat den Enkel angemeckert und sie hat den Enkel nicht angemeckert.
42A: Nur Maria hat das Märchen übersetzt und Katrin hat das Märchen übersetzt.
42B: Nur Maria hat das Märchen übersetzt und sie hat das Märchen nicht übersetzt.
43A: Nur Karla hat den Neffen erschreckt und Wiebke hat den Neffen erschreckt.
43B: Nur Karla hat den Neffen erschreckt und sie hat den Neffen nicht erschreckt.
44A: Nur Gisela hat das Team beurteilt und Per hat das Team beurteilt.
44B: Nur Gisela hat das Team beurteilt und sie hat das Team nicht beurteilt.
45A: Nur Claudia hat den Wein bestellt und Sandra hat den Wein bestellt.
45B: Nur Claudia hat den Wein bestellt und sie hat den Wein nicht bestellt.
46A: Nur Sophie hat den Tanz eröffnet und Bea hat den Tanz eröffnet.
46B: Nur Sophie hat den Tanz eröffnet und sie hat den Tanz nicht eröffnet.
47A: Nur Sabine hat den Tierpark besucht und Anna hat den Tierpark besucht.
47B: Nur Sabine hat den Tierpark besucht und sie hat den Tierpark nicht besucht.
48A: Nur Tabea hat den Mietvertrag unterschrieben und Nele hat den Mietvertrag unterschrieben.
48B: Nur Tabea hat den Mietvertrag unterschrieben und sie hat den Mietvertrag nicht unterschrieben.
390
Contradicting (not-)at-issueness
References
Atlas, Jay & Stephen Levinson. 1981. It-clefts, informativeness and logical form:
Radical pragmatics. In Peter Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics, 1–61. Academic
Press.
Bates, Douglas, Martin Mächler, Ben Bolker & Steve Walker. 2015. lme4: Linear
mixed-effects models using Eigen and S4. R package version 1.1-8.
Beaver, David & Brady Clark. 2008. Sense and Sensitivity: How Focus Determines
Meaning. Wiley-Blackwell.
Büring, Daniel. 2006. Focus projection and default prominence. In Valéria Molnár &
Susanne Winkler (eds.), The Architecture of Focus, 321–346. Berlin/New York:
Mouton De Gruyter. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110922011.321.
Büring, Daniel & Manuel Križ. 2013. It’s that, and that’s it! Exhaustivity and
homogeneity presuppositions in clefts (and definites). Semantics and Pragmatics
6(6). 1–29. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.6.6.
Byram-Washburn, Mary, Elsie Kaiser & Maria Luisa Zubizarreta. 2013. The English
it-cleft: No need to get exhausted. Poster: Linguistic Society of America (LSA).
Cummins, Chris, Patricia Amaral & Napoleon Katsos. 2013. Backgrounding and
accommodation of presuppositions: An experimental approach. In Emmanuel
Chemla, Vincent Homer & Grégoire Winterstein (eds.), Sinn und Bedeutung,
vol. 17, 201–218. Paris.
Delin, Judy. 1992. Properties of It-cleft presupposition. Journal of Semantics 9(4).
289–306. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/9.4.289.
Delin, Judy & Jon Oberlander. 1995. Syntactic constraints on dis-
course structure: The case of it-clefts. Linguistics 33. 456–500.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ling.1995.33.3.465.
Destruel, Emilie. 2012. The French c’est-cleft: An empirical study on its meaning
and use. In Christopher Piñón (ed.), Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics
9: Selected Papers from CSSP, 95–112.
Destruel, Emilie, Daniel Velleman, Edgar Onea, Dylan Bumford, Jingyang Xue
& David Beaver. 2015. A cross-linguistic study of the non-at-issueness of
exhaustive inferences. In Florian Schwarz (ed.), Experimental Perspectives on
Presuppositions, 135–156. Springer. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
07980-6_6.
Destruel, Emilie & Leah Velleman. 2014. Refining contrast: Empirical evidence
from the English it-cleft. In Christopher Piñón (ed.), Empirical Issues in Syntax
and Semantics 10, 197–214.
den Dikken, Marcel. 2013. Predication and specification in the syntax of cleft
sentences. In Katharina Hartmann & Tonjes Veenstra (eds.), Cleft Structures,
Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/la.208.02dik.
391
DeVeaugh-Geiss, Zimmermann, Onea, and Boell
Drenhaus, Heiner, Malte Zimmermann & Shravan Vasishth. 2011. Exhaustiveness
effects in clefts are not truth-functional. Journal of Neurolinguistics 24. 320–337.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jneuroling.2010.10.004.
Frege, Gottlob. 1892. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
Philosophische Kritik 25–50. English Translation: On Sense and Meaning, in
Brian McGuinness (ed), Frege: Collected Works, pp. 157–177, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
Hedberg, Nancy. 1990. Discourse pragmatics and cleft sentences in English. PhD
Thesis, University of Minnesota.
Hedberg, Nancy. 2000. The referential status of clefts. Language 76(4). 891–920.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/417203.
Heim, Irene & Angelika Kratzer. 1998. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Black-
well.
Horn, Larry. 1981. Exhaustiveness and the semantics of clefts. In Victoria E. Burke
& James Pustejovsky (eds.), North Eastern Linguistic Society (NELS), vol. 11,
125–142. Amherst: University of Massachusetts.
Horn, Larry. 2014. Information structure and the landscape of (non-)at-
issue meaning. In Caroline Féry & Shinichiro Ishihara (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Information Structure, Oxford University Press.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199642670.013.009. Online Publi-
cation Date: Dec 2014. Preprint version cited.
Krifka, Manfred. 2008. Basic notions of information structure. Acta Linguistica
Hungarica 55(3–4). 243–276. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/aling.55.2008.3-4.2.
Kuppevelt, Jan. 1996. Inferring from topics. Linguistics and Philosophy 19(4).
393–443. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00630897.
Mayol, Laia & Elena Castroviejo. 2013. How to cancel an implicature. Journal of
Pragmatics 50. 84–104. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.02.002.
Onea, Edgar & David Beaver. 2009. Hungarian focus is not exhausted. In Ed Cor-
many, Satoshi Ito & David Lutz (eds.), Semantics And Linguistic Theory (SALT),
vol. 19, 342–359. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v19i0.2524.
Percus, Orin. 1997. Prying open the cleft. In Kiyomi Kusumoto (ed.), North Eastern
Linguistic Society (NELS), vol. 27, 337–351.
Prince, Ellen. 1978. A comparison of wh-clefts and it-clefts in discourse. Language
54. 883–906. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/413238.
R Core Team. 2015. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing Vienna, Austria. http://www.R-project.
org/.
Saur, Eva-Maria. 2013. Clefts: Discourse function and the nature of exhaustivity
violation effects. M.Sc. Thesis, Universität Potsdam.
Simons, Mandy, David Beaver, Judith Tonhauser & Craige Roberts. 2010. What
392
Contradicting (not-)at-issueness
projects and why. In Nan Li & David Lutz (eds.), Semantics And Linguistic
Theory (SALT), vol. 20, 309–327. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v20i0.2584.
Skopeteas, Stavros & Gisbert Fanselow. 2011. Focus and the exclusion of alterna-
tives: On the interaction of syntactic structure with pragmatic inference. Lingua
11. 1693–1706. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2011.05.005.
Strawson, Peter. 1950. Referring. Mind 59. 320–44.
Tonhauser, Judith, David Beaver, Judith Degen, Marie-Catherine de Marneffe, Craige
Roberts & Mandy Simons. 2015. On the heterogeneity of projective content.
Presentation at Experimental and Crosslinguistic Evidence for the Distinction
between Implicatures and Presuppositions Workshop. ZAS, Berlin, July, 1–3.
Tonhauser, Judith, David Beaver, Craige Roberts & Mandy Simons. 2013.
Towards a taxonomy of projective content. Language 89(1). 66–109.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lan.2013.0001.
Velleman, Dan Bridges, David Beaver, Emilie Destruel, Dylan Bumford, Edgar
Onea & Liz Coppock. 2012. It-clefts are IT (Inquiry Terminating) constructions.
In Anca Chereches (ed.), Semantics And Linguistic Theory (SALT), vol. 22,
441–460. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v22i0.2640.
Joseph P. DeVeaugh-Geiss
Universität Potsdam
Department Linguistik
Karl-Liebknecht-Str. 24–25
D-14476 Potsdam
joseph.de.veaugh-geiss@uni-potsdam.de
Malte Zimmermann
Universität Potsdam
Exzellenzbereich Kognitionswissenschaften
Department Linguistik / SFB 632
Karl-Liebknecht-Str. 24–25
D-14476 Potsdam
mazimmer@uni-potsdam.de
Edgar Onea
Courant Research Centre “Text structures”
Nikolausberger Weg 23
D-37073 Göttingen
edgar.onea@zentr.uni-goettingen.de
Anna-Christina Boell
Courant Research Centre “Text structures”
Nikolausberger Weg 23
D-37073 Göttingen
anna-christina.boell@zentr.uni-
goettingen.de
393
